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Take, for instance, his six logical values. He holds, apparently, that whenever we know that a certain kind of content is *capable* of recurring in any conceivable experience, this knowledge has unconditional value. But, granted that such a piece of knowledge has unconditional value *sometimes*, how can one suppose that it has it *always*? And then, on the other hand, he seems to hold that the knowledge of causal relations never has unconditional value. What could be more arbitrary than the distinction between the two cases? This kind of knowledge also, it seems plain, is in fact a kind of knowledge which sometimes, but not always, has unconditional value. Or take his æsthetic values. Here, perhaps, it may be the case that we have an æsthetic value *wherever* we feel a harmony between two different wills, though this is by no means plain. But what reason is there for saying that we have æsthetic value *only where* we feel such a harmony? Professor Münsterberg can, as we saw, maintain this result only by maintaining that colors and lines and musical notes all have volitions, and this seems to be a purely fantastic hypothesis which there is nothing in observation to support.

These two propositions, that we have unconditional value where and only where a "superpersonal volition" is satisfied, and where and only where we find an "identical recurrence," are, I think, characteristic specimens of the kind of proposition of which this book is full.

London.

G. E. MOORE.

NATIONAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By Frederic Harrison.
 REALITIES AND IDEALS. By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908.

These volumes are the third and fourth of a series of essays collected and published by Mr. Frederic Harrison in the year 1907-1908. The essays have been collected from various sources. Most of them have appeared in reviews, English or American, or have been delivered as lectures, to the London Positivist Society, or on other public occasions. Mr. Harrison calls the collection a biographical series. The dates of their original composition cover a period of over forty years. They all represent a point of view that has altered little (or nothing) during all that time: the point of view of a Comtist who seeks to apply the prin-

ciples and maxims of his religion to current events and situations, political, social or economic. To revise and reissue the occasional utterances of forty years is to apply a test against which nothing but the power of seeing things *sub specie aeternitatis* could stand.

There are (at least) three ways of attaining to the point of view from which things are seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. One is the way of the philosopher; one is the way of the artist; one is the way of a detached and wide-roaming intelligence and sympathy which gradually builds up a cultured and unbiased judgment, untroubled by any haunting whisper of an axe to grind in the way of discipleship or orthodoxy. This latter is the way one expects to find in this book. But it is a way which Mr. Harrison never permits himself to follow. He always has a thesis: he never forgets for one moment to be a disciple; nor does he suffer his reader to forget it either. If Comtism does not commend itself to readers of these bulky volumes as an ever present help in trouble it will not be for want of a brilliant exponent, a mediator between gods and men, ever loyal to the god, ever sympathetic to the men. But there is a haunting sadness in these pages, a sadness which seems to deepen with the years, and the reader cannot but suspect that Mr. Harrison perceives that he has not the ear of his time, that the Comtist, like the Rustic of Horace, "still stands by the river, while the river flows on and flows past him forever."

A Kantian or Hegelian thinker may try to cast light on individual problems by bringing the particular under a universal law or principle of reason or experience, but a Comtist must try to bring his particular problem under a particular maxim of Comte. This results sometimes in a curious grouping of particulars. We find such heterogeneous problems as: the possibility of a national church; the disestablishment of the church of England the veto on drink; the problem of elementary education: and votes for women are all solved for Mr. Harrison when he remembers that "Positivism is (p. 197), in its essence, a revival of the eternal problem, how to found a spiritual power apart from any material power. And on that ground it has steadfastly opposed all state religions, all compulsory orthodoxy, all enforced education, all morality by act of Parliament, and virtue appraised by the civil magistrate. It is for teachers, preachers and philanthropists to make men sober, chaste, temperate, unselfish and industrious."

Mr. Harrison includes all women in the category of teachers. He says (p. 72), "The true function of woman is to educate, not children only, but men; to train to a higher civilization, not the rising generation, but the actual society." The assignment to women of this honorable function carries with it, in Mr. Harrison's judgment, their exclusion from political life, on the principle just quoted that "spiritual power" must be "kept apart from any material power." At this point, indeed, Mr. Harrison seems forced into what is surely an alarming position. "I am not," he says (p. 133), "for imposing on women any disability which I am not willing personally to accept. The worst of all despotisms, it has been said, is a *pedantocracy*—the rule of philosophers or moralists. . . . As for myself, in common with all those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State, I have through life reserved myself to seeking to influence opinion, whilst keeping clear of political life. . . . Though I have been on the register of several constituencies both urban and rural, I have hardly ever voted in a parliamentary contest in fifty years." It is not easy to know whom precisely Mr. Harrison means by "all those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State." If he means great and original philosophers we may perhaps dismiss our alarm. Such persons are not numerous, and are not likely to take the advice offered. But if it means that political sagacity and philosophic knowledge should ever be in inverse ratio to political action and responsibility then surely the utterance is the most pernicious *reductio ad absurdum* that ever befell a doctrine.

Mr. Harrison's reiterated insistence that teachers, preachers and philanthropists are to be the gods outside the machine—forever pointing out how the machine is to run, but forever out of the running themselves—is calculated to bring the godhead into derision more rapidly than any godhead or theology of them all.

It would be a mistake to conclude from what has been quoted above that Mr. Harrison bases his refusal of the claim of women to the franchise on the same ground as that on which he denies to himself the exercise of his citizenship. It is true he and they are both precluded, in his view, because they "*influence opinion*." But while Mr. Harrison "seeks to influence opinion by charging himself with political principle and the Ethics of the State" women must do this "by diffusing the spirit of affection, of self-

restraint, self-sacrifice, fidelity and purity. And this is to be effected, not by writing books about these things in the closet, nor by preaching sermons about them in the congregation, but by manifesting them hour by hour in each home by the magic of the voice, look, word and all the incommunicable graces of woman's tenderness" (p. 73).

So women are after all "teachers" only in the sense in which helpless babes and little, young, tender children have been, by the mute appeal of their helplessness, by their tender needs, their ignorance and "purity," among the most powerful influences in the humanizing of humanity. It is deeply true that women and babes have by their tender wants and mute appeals humanized men, have, shall we say, been "teachers" of men. (It hardly seems fully frank to use the word "teacher" with this significance.) It is also deeply true, nay, it is the profoundest truth about women, that the well of their widest influence and the spring of their highest inspiration lies in their unlimited capacity for self-forgetting devotion, and that they owe this spiritual power to the physical differentiation of their bodies, whereby they are capable of the supreme privilege of motherhood. But is this the whole truth? Are not women after all human, even in their motherhood? And can they not be human, and become ever more and more human in the quality of their devotion? Does it not matter to the community whether the devotion of women be "according to wisdom," so only they be devoted? Is there for Mr. Garrison the same deep "dualism" between human love and human wisdom, which he finds between "spiritual power" and "the power of the state"? Or, is it merely that he is thoroughly skeptical as to the genuine humanity of women, and thinks in his heart that their devotion at its best is akin to the devotion of man's best four-footed friend?

If only Mr. Garrison could see a joke!

Surely the smallest modicum of humor would have made him uneasy at the look of his final conclusion-of-the-whole-matter.

It is this: after many pages of wearisome reiteration of his opinion that women are incapable of forming a balanced judgment he concludes: "In an experience now of fifty years I cannot trust the judgment of even the most thoughtful women in all the matters of finance, armaments, alliances and legislation which make up national policy. To speak the truth, I only

know one woman whom I would always trust to come to a right decision." How fortunate is Mr. Harrison to have met with even one woman of such remarkable gifts!¹ One wonders whether the fortunate lady has, perhaps, had the advantage of being "influenced" by one of "those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State"? Or, whether, by long and intimate association with one, who "after fifty years' experience," finds "almost nothing to qualify in the judgment . . . passed at the time on the great events and the dominant personalities of the nineteenth century," she has learnt those judgments by heart, and produces infallibly, affectionately and self-sacrificingly the right one, at each appropriate opportunity?²

The treatment of "Votes for Women" is more detailed, more remorselessly unhumorous, more naïvely self-revealing than that of any other subject in this "biographical series"; but its point of view is typical. The belief in the necessary separation of spiritual power from governmental power leads not only to the conclusion that love and wisdom are forever divorced from one another in their highest manifestations in human life, but necessitates Mr. Harrison's various conclusions: (1) that the Church of England must be disestablished; (2) that the idea of a National Church is a forever impossible dream; (3) that no goodness in motive, . . . should blind us to the monstrous wrongfulness of any attempt to suppress alcohol by law; (4) that compulsory education is a "fatal mistake"; and (5) that the secular solution is the only one in all primary state-aided schools.

Mr. Harrison ranges over a vast field in selecting the subject-matter of his various essays, but whether his subject be political, social, economic, literary or biographical, it is impossible to read his vivid and animated pages without feeling braced and enlightened, and mollified by contact with a mind rich in varied knowledge, alert and profound interests, and wide and penetrating sympathies. This is invariably true even when the reader differs profoundly from Mr. Harrison's conclusions, or

¹ One wonders whether he has met with more than one man from whom he would always expect as much.

² It was surely unnecessary for Mr. Harrison to add that his friend "happens to be a resolute opponent of Votes for Women."

when the subjects are such ancient history as the Franco-Prussian War, or the Bismarckian militarism, so controversial as votes for women, or so uninspiring as parliamentary procedure.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY. By Prof. Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. xii, 398.

Professor Royce has published under the title of 'The Philosophy of Loyalty' a course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston in the winter of 1907. The book, as the author confesses, while growing out of academic exercises and related to his professional work, is neither a text-book nor "an elaborately technical philosophical research. It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit."

The new light in which we are asked by Professor Royce to view our ideals is the spirit of loyalty shining as the central sun of the moral universe. All the lights that lighten men—as conscience, beauty, duty, truth—may be expressed in terms of loyalty. And the discovery of a simplifying, unifying doctrine of duty in these days of "homesickness and spiritual estrangement, and confusion of mind about moral ideals," the author thinks a "peculiarly precious mission."

It seems to us that Professor Royce has fulfilled that mission in a peculiarly convincing way. His book is unique in title and purpose. His main thesis that "loyalty to loyalty is the fulfilment of the whole moral law" is at once startling and incomprehensible. But as the author goes on to explain how loyalty to the idea of loyalty is the fulfilment of every rational and satisfying desire of man, we see how the individual finds himself and makes valid and durable his very individualism only as a contribution to the total web of loyalties which weaves the visible pattern of this moral world. A life lived with no moral plan is at worst an anarchic animalism, at best a passive organism. True personality is reached only in dedication to a large ideal, which includes not our little self alone but all the selves that are seeking the expression of their personality through the ideal.